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ABSTRACT
The crisis of the advanced economies in 2008–09 has focused new attention on money and credit fluctuations,
financial crises, and policy responses. We study the behavior of money, credit, and macroeconomic
indicators over the long run based on a new historical dataset for 14 countries over the years 1870–2008,
using the data to study rare events associated with financial crisis episodes. We present new evidence
that leverage in the financial sector has increased strongly in the second half of the twentieth century
as shown by a decoupling of money and credit aggregates. We show for the first time how monetary
policy responses to financial crises have been more aggressive post-1945, but how despite these policies
the output costs of crises have remained large. Importantly, we demonstrate that credit growth is a
powerful predictor of financial crises, suggesting that such crises are “credit booms gone wrong” and
that policymakers ignore credit at their peril. It is only with the long-run comparative data assembled
for this paper that these patterns can be seen clearly.
Moritz Schularick
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alan.m.taylor@virginia.eduIn the brief history of macroeconomics, the subject of money and banking has witnessed wide ﬂuctu-
ations in both its internal consensus and external inﬂuence. The crisis of 2008–09 has reignited a new
interest in understanding money and credit ﬂuctuations in the macroeconomy and the crucial roles they
could play in the ampliﬁcation, propagation, and generation of shocks both in normal times and, even
more so, in times of ﬁnancial distress. This may reopen a number of fundamental fault lines in modern
macroeconomic thinking—between theories that treat the ﬁnancial system as irrelevant, or, at least, not
central to the understanding of economic outcomes, and those that reserve a central role for ﬁnancial
intermediation. Economic history has an important role to play in this debate. The failures revealed by
the present crisis demand that we humbly return to macroeconomic and ﬁnancial history, in the hope
that better empirical evidence may provide safer guidance than introspection alone.
Still, for other more pragmatic reasons a return to the past is inevitable, because “rare events” thrust
comparative economic history to the fore. If regular business cycles are roughly once per decade events,
then we already have very few observations in the postwar data for any given country. More disruptive
events like depressions and ﬁnancial crises are rarer still, at least in developed economies. When sample
sizes are this small, providing a detailed quantitative rendition, or even just a sketch of the basic stylized
facts,requiresthatweworkonalargercanvas,expandingourdatasetacrossbothtimeandspace. Hence,
scholars have reached back to make careful comparisons not just with past decades, but past centuries,
using formal statistical analysis to examine the nature of ﬁnancial crises and other rare events with new
panel datasets, as in recent work by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009), Robert J. Barro
(2009), and Miguel Almunia et al. (2010). In the same spirit, the purpose of this paper is to step back
and ask such questions about money, credit, and the macroeconomy in the long run. As a key part of
this effort, we present a new long-run historical dataset for 14 developed countries over almost 140 years
which will provide not just the empirical backbone for our research agenda but also serve as a valuable
resource for future investigations by other scholars interested in this subject.
Economic thinking about the role of money and credit in the macroeconomy has changed substan-
tially over time (Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet 1997, chap. 6). The experience of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century, including the disruptions of the 1930s, formed the foundation of the
“moneyview”whichisindeliblyassociatedwiththeseminalcontributionsofMiltonFriedmanandAnna
J.Schwartz(1963).1 Inthelatetwentiethcenturythe“irrelevanceview”gainedinﬂuence, associatedwith
the ideas of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958) among others, where real economic decisions
became independent of ﬁnancial structure altogether. Starting in the 1980s, the “credit view” gradually
attracted attention and adherents. In this view, starting with the works of Frederic S. Mishkin (1978), Ben
S.Bernanke(1983),andMarkGertler(1988),anddrawingonideasdatingbacktoIrvingFisher(1933)and
John G. Gurley and E. S. Shaw (1955), the mechanisms and quantities of bank credit matter, above and
beyond the level of bank money.2 Still, one strand of criticism notes that in most ﬁnancial-accelerator
models credit is largely passive—a propagator of shocks, not an independent source of shocks (Claudio
Borio 2008; Michael Hume and Andrew Sentance 2009).3 By contrast, in other classes of models, multi-
1In this account, the central bank can and must exert proper indirect control of aggregate bank liabilities, but beyond that,
the actual functions of the banks, and their role in credit creation via bank loans, are of no great importance.
2The entire bank balance sheet, the asset side, leverage, and composition, may have macroeconomic implications. One
consequencemaybeanampliﬁcationofthemonetarytransmissionmechanism,thatis,aﬁnancialacceleratoreffect(Bernanke
and Alan S. Blinder 1988). Another issue might be ﬁnancial fragility induced by collateral constraints (Bernanke, Gertler, and
Simon Gilchrist 1999 or BGG). This important turn in the literature in the 1980s was guided by more inductive empirical work,
where warnings about the role of credit included Otto Eckstein and Allen Sinai (1986) and Henry Kaufman (1986).
3This limitation was well understood: for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995, p. 28) stated that “[t]he credit channel is an
enhancement mechanism, not a truly independent or parallel channel.” A step forward is to introduce disturbances to credit
constraintsinaBGG-stylemodel(CharlesNolanandChristophThoenissen2009; UrbanJermannandVincenzoQuadrini2009),
1ple equilibria or feedback effects are possible (Bernanke and Gertler 1995; Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John
Moore 1997); work by John Geanakoplos (2009) on leverage cycles meshes with this view.4
Given these disparate views, we ask: what are the facts? To our knowledge, the dynamics of money,
credit, and output have not been studied across a broad sample of countries over the long run. There
are, however, a few recent studies that are comparable to ours in spirit, in that they lift the veil of ﬁnance
to re-examine the link between ﬁnancial structure and real activity in the past or present. Tobias Adrian
and Hyun Song Shin (2008, 2009), Enrique G. Mendoza and Marco E. Terrones (2008), as well as Hume
and Sentance (2009) have analysed the structural changes in the ﬁnancial system in recent years and the
consequences for ﬁnancial stability and monetary policy. Previously, Peter L. Rousseau and Paul Wachtel
(1998) had investigated the link between economic performance and ﬁnancial intermediation between
1870 and 1929 for ﬁve industrial countries, while Barry Eichengreen and Kris Mitchener (2003), among
others, have studied the credit boom preceding the Great Depression.5
1 Money, Credit, and Crises in The Long Run
As quantitative historians we want to know whether the structures and dynamics of money, credit and
the macroeconomy have shifted in the long run—and, how, and with what effects. The contribution of
this paper is to make a start on the broader, systematic, cross-country quantitative history of money and
credit, by focussing on three main questions: (i) which key stylized facts can we derive from the long-
run trends in money and credit aggregates?; (ii) how have the monetary policy responses to ﬁnancial
crises changed over time?; and (iii) what role do credit and money play as a cause of ﬁnancial crises? Our
empirical analysis proceeds as follows.
We ﬁrst document and discuss our newly assembled dataset on money and credit, aligned with vari-
ous macroeconomic indicators, covering 14 developed countries from 1870 to 2008. We establish a num-
ber of important stylized facts about what we shall refer to as the “two eras of ﬁnance capitalism”. The
ﬁrst era runs from 1870 to 1939. In this era, money and credit were volatile but over the long run they
maintained a roughly stable relationship to each other, and to the size of the economy measured by GDP.
TheonlyexceptionwastheGreatDepressionperiod: inthe1930smoneyandcreditaggregatescollapsed.
In this ﬁrst era, the one studied by Friedman and Schwartz, the “money view” of the world looks entirely
plausible.
However, the second ﬁnancial era, starting in 1945, looks very different. First, money and credit be-
gan a long postwar recovery, trending up rapidly and then surpassing their pre-1940 levels compared to
GDP by about 1970. That trend continued to the present and, in addition, credit itself then started to
decouple from broad money and grew rapidly, via a combination of increased leverage and augmented
funding via the nonmonetary liabilities of banks. With the banking sector progressively more leveraged
in the second ﬁnancial era, particularly in the last decade or so, the divergence between credit supply
and money supply offers prima facie support for the credit view as against a pure money view; we have
entered an age of unprecedented ﬁnancial risk and leverage, a new global stylized fact that is not fully
though we still need to know precisely what drives the processes or beliefs that create such disturbances.
4More radical departures are possible in an older tradition; in the work of scholars such as Hyman P . Minsky (1977), the
ﬁnancial system itself is prone to generate economic instability through endogenous credit bubbles with waves of euphoria and
anxiety. And indeed, economic historians such as Charles P . Kindleberger (1978) have generally been sympathetic to such ideas
pointing to recurrent episodes of credit-driven instability throughout ﬁnancial history.
5A great number of postwar studies have focussed on the role of ﬁnancial structure in comparative development and long-
run economic growth, a question that is related but distinct from our analysis (Raymond W. Goldsmith 1969; E. S. Shaw 1973;
Ronald I. McKinnon 1973; Woo S. Jung 1986; Robert G. King and Ross Levine 1993).
2appreciated.
In a second empirical investigation we look at money, credit and the consequences of crises. We use
an event-analysis approach to study the co-evolution of money and credit aggregates and real economic
activity in the ﬁve-year window following a ﬁnancial crisis. We also pursue this analysis in two periods,
1870–1939 and 1945–2008. This approach is motivated by our identiﬁcation of two distinct eras of ﬁ-
nance, as above; but it also reﬂects the very different monetary and regulatory framework after WW2,
namely the shift away from gold to ﬁat money, the greater role of activist macroeconomic policies, the
greateremphasisonbanksupervisionanddepositinsurance,andtheexpandedroleoftheLenderofLast
Resort. Our results show dramatically different crisis dynamics in the two eras, or “now” versus “then.”
In postwar crises, central banks have strongly supported money base growth, and crises have not been
accompanied by a collapse of broad money, although credit does still contract. On the real side, a strik-
ing result is that the economic impact of ﬁnancial crises is no more muted in the postwar era than in the
prewar era. However, given the much larger ﬁnancial systems we have today (the ﬁrst stylized fact above)
therealeffectsofthepostwarregimecouldtaketheformofpreventingpotentiallyevenlarger realoutput
losses that could be realized in today’s more heavily ﬁnancialized economies without such policies. With
regard to prices, inﬂation has tended to rise after crises in the post-WW2 era, with economies avoiding
the strong Fisherian debt-deﬂation mechanism that tended to operate in pre-WW2 crises, and this could
beanotherfactorpreventinglargeroutputlosses. ThebottomlineisthatthelessonsoftheGreatDepres-
sion, once learned, were put into practice. After 1945 ﬁnancial crises were fought with more aggressive
monetary policy responses, banking systems imploded neither so frequently nor as dramatically, and de-
ﬂation was avoided—although crises still had real costs. However, in tandem with our previous ﬁndings,
it is natural to ask to what extent the implicit and explicit insurance of ﬁnancial systems by governments
encouraged the massive expansion of leverage that emerged after the war.
In a ﬁnal empirical exercise we ask what we can learn about the fragility of ﬁnancial systems using
our credit data. Speciﬁcally, we test one element of the credit view argument—associated with Minsky,
Kindleberger, andothers—thatﬁnancialcrisescanbeseenas“creditboomsgonewrong.” Thisapproach
also echoes Joseph Schumpeter’s diagnosis that “reckless lending” and ﬁnancial speculation are closely
linked to credit creation as the “monetary complement of innvoation” over the business cycle (Schum-
peter 1939). We follow the early-warning approach and construct a typical macroeconomic lagged in-
formation set at any date T for all countries in our sample. Lagged credit growth turns out to be highly
signiﬁcant as a predictor of ﬁnancial crises, but the addition of other variables adds very little explana-
tory power. Introducing interaction terms, we also ﬁnd some support for the notion that ﬁnancial stabil-
ity risks increase with the size of the ﬁnancial sector and that boom-and-bust episodes in stock markets
become more problematic in more ﬁnancialized economies.
These new results from long-run data inform current controversies over macroeconomic policy in
developed countries. Speciﬁcally, the pre-2008 consensus argued that monetary policy should follow a
“rule” based only on output gaps and inﬂation, but a few dissenters thought that credit deserved to be
watched carefully and incorporated into a broader central bank policy framework. The inﬂuence of the
creditviewhascertainlyadvancedafterthe2008–09crash,justasrespecthaswanedfortheglibassertion
that central banks could ignore potential bubbles and easily clean up after they burst.
2 The Data
Tostudythelong-rundynamicsofmoney,creditandoutputweassembledanewannualdatasetcovering
14 countries over the years 1870–2008. The countries covered are the United States, Canada, Australia,
3Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United King-
dom. At the core of our dataset are yearly data for aggregate bank loans and total balance sheet size of
the banking sector. We complemented these credit series with narrow (M0 or M1) and broad (typically
M2 or M3) monetary aggregates as well as data on nominal and real output, inﬂation and investment.
To investigate the potential inter-relationship between crises, credit, and asset prices, we have also col-
lectedlong-runstockmarketindicesfromanumberof(partlynew)sourcesasdiscussedinalatersection
below.
The two core deﬁnitions we work with are as follows. Total lending or bank loans is deﬁned as the
end-of-year amount of outstanding domestic currency lending by domestic banks to domestic house-
holds and non-ﬁnancial corporations (excluding lending within the ﬁnancial system). Banks are deﬁned
broadly as monetary ﬁnancial institutions and include savings banks, postal banks, credit unions, mort-
gageassociations,andbuildingsocietieswheneverthedataareavailable. Weexcludedbrokeragehouses,
ﬁnance companies, insurance ﬁrms, and other ﬁnancial institutions. Total bank assets is then deﬁned as
the year-end sum of all balance sheet assets of banks with national residency (excluding foreign currency
assets).
It is important to point out that the deﬁnitions of credit, money, and banking institutions vary pro-
foundly across countries, which makes cross-country comparisons difﬁcult. In addition, in some cases,
such as the Netherlands or Spain, historical data cover only commercial banks, not savings banks or
credit co-operatives. In this paper, we therefore focus predominantly on the time-series dimension of
the data and for the most part avoid outright comparisons in levels (e.g., we employ country ﬁxed ef-
fects). However, the deﬁnitions of money and credit aggregates have also changed within countries over
time in response to institutional or ﬁnancial innovation. Building a consistent and comparable dataset
was therefore no easy task and we often had to combine data from various sources to arrive at reasonably
consistent long-run time series.6 Further details on our dataset can be found in the web appendix, but
Table 1 summarizes the key variables at our disposal.
Several features of the data are already apparent in Table 1. In the upper panel, the major ratios of
assets and loans to money and GDP both climbed after the war, but the averages disguise some impor-
tant trends. The trend breaks are more apparent as we study the growth rates in the lower panel where
it is clear that annual growth rates of broad money (3.65%), loans (4.16%), and assets (4.33%) were fairly
similar in the pre-WW2 period; in contrast, after WW2 average broad money growth (8.57%) was much
smaller than loan growth (10.94%) and asset growth (10.48%). The loan-money ratios grew at just 0.17%
per year before WW2 but 2.22% per year after, a 20-fold increase in the growth rate of this key leverage
measure. Similarly asset-money growth rates jumped from 0.43% to 1.82% per year, a quadrupling. Thus
even at the level of simple summary statistics we can grasp that the behavior of money and credit ag-
gregates changed markedly in the middle of the twentieth century. However, a more detailed analysis of
these and other data brings the differences between the two eras into sharper relief.
6OurkeysourceswereofﬁcialstatisticalpublicationssuchastheU.S.FederalReserve’sAllBankStatisticsortheBundesbank’s
Geld- und Kreditwesenstatistik. We also draw on the work of individual economic historians such as David Sheppard’s statistics
for the British ﬁnancial system or Malcolm Urquhart’s work on Canadian ﬁnancial statistics. And we are indebted to our many
colleagues who provided advice and assistance to us in all these tasks. We wish to acknowledge the support we received from
Joost Jonker and Corry van Renselaar (Netherlands); Gianni Toniolo and Claire Giordano (Italy); Kevin O’Rourke (Denmark);
Eric Monnet and Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur (France); Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich (Germany); Rodney Edvinsson (Sweden); Youssef
Cassis (Switzerland); Pablo Martin Aceña (Spain); Ryland Thomas (Britain). In addition, we would like to thank Michael Bordo
and Solomos Solomou for sharing monetary and real data from their data collections with us. Kris Mitchener directed us to the
sources for Japan; Magdalena Korb and Nikolai Baumeister helped with translation.
4Table 1: Annual Summary Statistics by Period
Pre-World War 2 Post-World War 2
N mean s.d. N mean s.d.
Loans/Money 665 0.4217 0.3582 831 0.5470 0.4239
Assets/Money 617 0.7132 0.4453 828 1.0135 0.6688
Broad Money/GDP 742 0.5343 0.2070 834 0.6458 0.2405
Loans/Money 642 0.7581 0.4382 833 0.8380 0.4942
Assets/Money 586 1.2790 0.5642 831 1.5758 0.7525
 log Real GDP 868 0.0148 0.0448 854 0.0270 0.0253
 log CPI 826  0.0002 0.0568 852 0.0452 0.0396
 log Narrow Money 787 0.0278 0.0789 825 0.0780 0.0717
 log Money 741 0.0365 0.0569 833 0.0857 0.0552
 log Loans 652 0.0416 0.0898 833 0.1094 0.0749
 log Assets 607 0.0433 0.0691 825 0.1048 0.0678
 log Loans/Money 626 0.0017 0.0729 825 0.0222 0.0643
 log Assets/Money 573 0.0043 0.0452 820 0.0182 0.0595
Notes: Money denotes broad money. Loans denote total bank loans. Assets denote total bank assets. The sample runs from
1870 to 2008. War and aftermath periods are excluded (1914–19 and 1939–47), as is the post-WW1 German crisis (1920–25).
The 14 countries in the sample are the United States, Canada, Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
3 Money and Credit in Two Eras of Finance Capitalism
In a ﬁrst step, we analyse the new dataset with an eye on deriving a number stylized facts about credit
and monetary aggregates from the gold standard era until today.
The ﬁrst important fact that emerges from the data is the presence of two distinct “eras of ﬁnance
capitalism” as shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 displays the trend in credit and money aggregates
relative GDP, while Figure 2 displays the long–run trends in the credit to money ratios, where in each case
we show the average trend for the 14 countries in our dataset. To construct these average global trends,
both here and in some other ﬁgures that follow, we show the mean of the predicted time effects from
ﬁxed country-and-year effects regressions for the dependent variable of interest. That is for any variable
xit we estimate the ﬁxed effects regression xit = ai +bt +eit and then plot the estimated year effects bt
to show the average global level of x in year t.
From these ﬁgures we see that the ﬁrst ﬁnancial era lasted from 1870 to WW2. In this era, money
and credit were volatile but over the long run they maintained a roughly stable relationship to each other
andrelativetothesizeoftheeconomyasmeasuredbyGDP.Moneyandcreditgrewjustalittlefasterthan
GDPintheﬁrstfewdecadesoftheclassicalgoldstandarderafrom1870toabout1890,butthenremained
more or less stable relative to GDP until the credit boom of the 1920s and the Great Depression. In the
1930s,bothmoneyandcreditaggregatescollapsed. Figure2showsthattherelationshipbetweentheloan
orassetmeasuresandbroadmoneyremainedalmostperfectlystablethroughouttheﬁrsterauptoWW2,
save for the 1930s global credit crunch. In that epoch, money growth and credit growth were essentially
two sides of the same coin. The same was not true in the second era after WW2, when loans and assets
both embarked on a long, strong secular uptrend relative to broad money, and here both graphs reveal
profound structural shifts in the relationship between credit, money, and output.
Thus, during the ﬁrst era of ﬁnance capitalism, up to 1939, the era studied by canonical monetarists
like Friedman and Schwartz, the “money view” of the world looks entirely reasonable. Banks’ liabilities

































































































































































Figure 1: Aggregates Relative to GDP (Year Effects)
ronment, by steering aggregate liabilities of the banking sector, the central bank could hope to exert a
smooth and steady inﬂuence over aggregate lending.
The relationships changed dramatically in the post-1945 period. First, credit began a long recovery
after the dual shocks to the ﬁnancial sector from the Great Depression and the war. Loans and bank as-
setstookoffonaveryrapidupwardtrendintheBrettonWoodseraasseeninFigure1, andtheymanaged
to surpass their pre-1940 ratios, compared to GDP, by about 1970. Second, credit not only grew strongly
relative to GDP, but also relative to broad money after WW2, via a combination of higher leverage and (af-
ter the 1970s) through the use of new sources of funding, mainly debt securities, creating more and more
non-monetary bank liabilities.7 Again, the pre-WW2 ratios of credit and assets to money were surpassed
circa 1970, as seen in Figure 2. Loan-money and asset-money ratios, shown here in logs, continued ever
higher, attaining levels +0.750 log points higher than their prewar average by around 2000 (i.e., about 2
in levels).
We also note that this increase in the credit to money ratio does not only apply to a few individual
countries,e.g.,theusualAnglo-Saxonsuspects,buthasbeenacommonphenomenoninmanycountries.
Figure 3 shows the log loan-money and log asset-money ratios for all countries at decadal dates. Country
7It is even likely that our numbers underestimate the process of credit creation in the past decades as a growing portion of





































































































































































































Figure 2: Aggregates Relative to Broad Money (Year Effects)
experiences varied somewhat before WW2, but in a way consistent with accepted historical narratives.
For example, the countries of the late nineteenth century periphery in our sample—Italy and Spain—
saw rapid ﬁnancial catch-up relative to the core in the 1870–1939 period, and this explains their rapid
leverage growth in the pre-WW2 period, when most other countries exhibit a ﬂat trend. But after WW2,
for all countries in the sample, the experience is strikingly similar—a trend increase in both ratios from
the 1950s to the present. These new insights expose a global story of decades of slowly encroaching risk
on bank balance sheets, not one conﬁned to a few proﬂigate nations.
To sum up, the ratio of credit to money remained broadly stable between 1870 and 1930. The Great
Depression then saw a marked deleveraging of the banking system. In the postwar period, banks ﬁrst
grew their loan books relative to available deposits, before sustaining high credit growth through increas-
ing reliance on non-monetary liabilities. The dynamics are basically comparable between the European
countries in the sample and the United States, but the pace of the balance sheet growth has been even
higher in Europe than in the United States, as, in the latter, non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries like broker
dealers have played a large role and exhibited even stronger balance sheet expansion than the commer-
cial banks (Adrian and Shin 2008).
What does this structural change mean for the questions about money, credit, and output raised



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Aggregates Relative to Broad Money (By Country)
traditional monetarist view could potentially become more problematic. While central banks might still
be ableto steer aggregatecredit through themonetary aggregates, it isalso possible thatthe link between
money and credit becomes looser than in a situation where banks’ liabilities are predominantly or even
exclusively monetary. This is exactly what many of the world’s central banks found out in the 1980s, as
Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner (1992) have documented.
Second, if we look at the ratio of bank credit to non-monetary liabilities on banks’ balance sheets,
it is easy to see how funding structures have changed in a historically unprecedented way. Banks’ ac-
cess to nonmonetary sources of ﬁnance has become an important factor for aggregate credit provision.
Thus, what happens in ﬁnancial markets—borrowing conditions, liquidity, market conﬁdence—starts to
matter more than ever for credit creation and ﬁnancial stability, possibly amplifying the cyclicality of ﬁ-
nancing in a major way (Adrian and Shin 2008). While these links still need to be explored in greater
detail, the consequences for macroeconomic stability could be powerful, since the conventional trans-
mission mechanisms can now be buffeted by large ﬁnancial shocks. Last but not least, the increasing
dependence of the banking system on access to funding from ﬁnancial markets could also mean that
central banks are forced to underwrite the entire funding market in times of distress in order to avoid the
collapse of the banking system as witnessed in 2008–09. This “mission creep” follows from the fact that
banking stability can no longer rest on the foundations of deposit insurance alone, with the Lender of
Last Resort now having to confront wholesale (i.e., non-deposit) bank runs.
This hitherto unknown historical backdrop buttresses the argument that without stronger forms of
8capital and/or liquidity requirements, banking systems will be prone to skate on the thinnest of ice (Anil
K.Kashyapetal. 2008; EmmanuelFarhiandJeanTirole2009). Indeed,thesedevelopmentscorrelatewith
the frequency of ﬁnancial crises. The frequency of crises in the 1945–71 period was virtually zero, when
liquidity hoards were ample and leverage was low; but since 1971, as these hoards evaporated and banks
levered up, crises became more frequent, occurring with a 4% annual probability.8
4 Money, Credit, and Output after Financial Crises: An Event Analysis
In this section we look at ﬁnancial crises in more depth. We are able to demonstrate the existence of dra-
matically different crisis dynamics in the two eras of ﬁnance capitalism, or now versus then. We exploit
our long-run dataset with an eye on improving our understanding of the behavior of money and credit
aggregates as well as the responses of the real economy and prices in ﬁnancial crisis windows before and
after WW2. We were concerned that our results might be strongly inﬂuenced by the Great Depression,
so we also re-ran our analysis excluding data for the 1930s Depression window, but we obtained similar
results as documented below. We ﬁnd substantially different dynamics in the pre- and post-WW2 peri-
ods which we think reﬂect different monetary and regulatory frameworks: the shift away from gold to ﬁat
money, the greater role of activist macroeconomic policies, and greater emphasis on bank supervision
and deposit insurance.
For our event-analysis we adopt an annual coding of ﬁnancial crisis episodes based on documentary
descriptions in Bordo et al. (2001) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), two widely-used historical data sets
that we compared and merged for a consistent deﬁnition of event windows (a table showing the crisis
events can be found in the web appendix). In line with the previous studies we deﬁne ﬁnancial crises as
events during which a country’s banking sector experiences bank runs, sharp increases in default rates
accompanied by large losses of capital that result in public intervention, bankruptcy, or forced merger
of ﬁnancial institutions. We have corroborated the crisis histories from Bordo et al. (2001) and Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) with alternative codings found in the databases compiled by Luc Laeven and Fabian
Valencia (2008), as well the evidence described in Stephen G. Cecchetti et al. (2009). In a last step, we
have sent the crisis dates to colleagues who are country specialists and asked them to conﬁrm the dates
that we have listed. A table showing the crisis events by country-year can be found in the web appendix.
In total, we identify 79 major banking crises in the 14 countries we study. We are hopeful that the crisis
dates will prove useful in future research.9
Figure 4 opens the discussion with a look at the behaviour of money and credit in the aftermath of
ﬁnancial crises. We see that there are clear differences between the two eras of ﬁnance capitalism. Before
WW2, credit and money growth dipped signiﬁcantly below normal levels after crisis events and did not
recover to pre-crisis growth rates until fully ﬁve years after the crisis. In contrast, after WW2 a dip in
the growth rate of the monetary and credit aggregates is hardly discernible in the aftermath of a crisis.10
8Data on the frequency of ﬁnancial crises are taken from Michael Bordo et al. (2001, Figure 1, banking crises).
9Wewishtothank,withoutimplicating,DanielWaldenstroem(Stockholm),Pierre-CyrilleHautcoeurandAngeloRiva(Paris),
Jan Klovland (Oslo), Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich (Berlin), Reinhard Spree (Munich), Margrit Grabas (Saarbrucken), Charles Tilly
(Munster), Mari Oonuki (Tokyo), Tobias Straumann (Zurich), Joost Jonker (Utrecht), Michael Bordo (Rutgers), Pablo Martin-
Acenã (Alcalà). We asked these scholars whether they agreed that systemic banking crises took place in the given years and if
any events were missing. In a few cases the question was not whether a signiﬁcant crisis had occurred, but whether it should be
called systemic. In such cases, we used some discretion to ensure comparability between countries. We generally coded crises
if a signiﬁcant part of the banking system was affected as measured by the number or the size of affected institutions.
10It is sometimes claimed that negative credit growth would be a signal of a credit crisis (e.g., V. V. Chari et al. 2008). In our
data, before WW2 crises were associated with slightly negative average loan growth in the year after the crisis began. However,






























































































































































































































Figure 4: Aggregates (Post Crisis Periods Relative to Normal)
We infer that in the later period, central banks have supported growth of the monetary base, prevented
collapse of broad money, and thus kept bank lending at comparatively high levels. Only total bank assets
nowbehaveinameaningfullydifferentwayafterﬁnancialcrises,aswewilldiscussinfurtherdetailbelow.
TurningtorealeconomiceffectsshowninFigure5,itbecomesclearthattheimpactofﬁnancialcrises
was more muted in the postwar era in absolute numbers, but of comparable magnitude relative to trend.
As mentioned before, this result holds up even when the Great Depression is excluded from the prewar
event analysis. Measured by output declines, ﬁnancial crises remain severe in the post-1945 period. The
maximum decline in real investment activity was somewhat more pronounced before WW2, albeit with
a sharp bounce back after 4 to 5 years.
Turning to Figure 6, we see that it is with regard to price developments that a major difference be-
tween the two eras appears, which is again not driven by the Great Depression. Financial crises in the
prewar era were associated with pronounced deﬂation (for three years), and a stagnation of narrow and
broad money growth. Financial crises in the postwar era were if anything accompanied by some up-
wards pressure on inﬂation relative to normal, potentially due to the much more active monetary policy
response, as shown by the expansion of narrow money. Our data suggest that through more activist poli-
cies the strong Fisherian debt-deﬂation mechanism that typically operated in prewar crises was avoided
in the postwar period. The internal reallocation of real debt burdens was therefore likely to have been
dramatically different in the two periods.
The bottom line of our event analysis is the following. Policymakers learned lessons from the Great
Depression. After this watershed, ﬁnancial crises were fought with a more aggressive monetary policy









































































































































































































Figure 5: Real Variables (Post Crisis Periods Relative to Normal)
response and quick support for the ﬁnancial sector. Also institutional responses to the Great Depression
such as deposit insurance are likely to have contributed to greater stability of the monetary aggregates in
postwar crises. As a consequence, irregular deleveraging of the ﬁnancial sector was avoided and aggre-
gate asset and loan growth remained relatively high.
Table 2 summarises the key lessons of our event study by showing the cumulative level effects (rela-
tive to trend growth in non-crisis years ﬁve years after the event) of ﬁnancial crises in the two eras of ﬁ-
nancecapitalism. Whatstandsoutclearlyispositiveinﬂation,highernarrowmoneygrowthandasmaller
deleveraging (on the loan side) that has taken place in crisis episodes in the second half of the twentieth
century(comparecolumns1and3). Recallingtheimportantprovisothatalldeviationsaremeasuredrel-
ative to the noncrisis trend, we see that before WW2, ﬁve years after a crisis year the level of broad money
was 14 percent below trend, and bank loans 25 percent below trend. In the postwar period, however,
narrow money growth did not slow down relative to trend, and the declines were a mere 8 percent (not
statistically signiﬁcant) for broad money and 14 percent for bank loans.
Of course, a key institutional difference between the pre- and post-war environment is the introduc-
tion of deposit insurance in many countries in response to the banking panics during the Great Depres-
sion. The effects are visible in our long-run data which show the greater stability of narrow and broad
monetary aggregates in ﬁnancial crises in the postwar era. By contrast, total bank assets, which rely on
uninsured sources of funding to a greater extent, have actually become more volatile in the postwar era.
Turning next to the effect on the securities side of banks’ balance sheets, the signs of a changing response
to crises are even stronger, with bank assets falling 26 percent below trend in the postwar period, ver-











































































































































































































































Figure 6: Money and Inﬂation (Post Crisis Periods Relative to Normal)
behaviour of nonloan items on the balance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions is particularly procyclical.
Turning to real effects, it is interesting to observe that despite the much more aggressive policy re-
sponse, the cumulative real effects have been even somewhat stronger in the postwar period. In the
aftermath of postwar ﬁnancial crises output dropped a cumulative 7.9 percent relative to trend, and real
investment by more than 25 percent. The prewar output decline effect, however, is largely an artefact
of the massive ﬁnancial implosions of the 1930s. Excluding the 1930s (see column 2), the cumulative
real output and investment declines after crises were substantially smaller and not statistically signiﬁ-
cant. The ﬁnding of limited losses prior to the 1930s would be consistent with the idea that in the earlier
decades of our sample the ﬁnancial sectors played a less central role in the economy and ﬁnancial crises
werehencelesscostly. Itisalsoconsistentwiththeviewthateconomiessufferedlessfromnominalrigid-
ity, especially before 1913, as compared to the 1930s, and hence were better able to adjust to nominal
shocks like crisis-induced debt-deﬂation (Natalia Chernyshoff et al. 2009).
The ﬁnding that the real effects of ﬁnancial crises have not been less pronounced despite stronger
policyresponsesandinstitutionalsafeguardssuchasdepositinsuranceissurprising. However, itmeshes
with research on historical business cycles that has shown that recessions after WW2 have become less
frequent, but not less severe (Christina D. Romer 1999), a result that is most clearly true when the Great
Depression is treated as a special case. These ﬁndings are mirrored in our data. Moreover, since we
focus on postcrisis dynamics, our data do not yet reﬂect the real effects of the Great Recession of 2008–09
because events are still unfolding and this datapoint is not in our sample. But given the severity of the
recent recession this would certainly strengthen our overall result that the real effects of ﬁnancial crises
have not become less severe.
12Table 2: Cumulative Effects After Financial Crises
Cumulative log level effect, after years 0–5 Pre-World War 2 Pre-World War 2, Post-World War 2
of crisis, versus noncrisis trend, for: excluding 1930s
Log broad money  0.139  0.103  0.077
(0.027) (0.029) (0.040)
Log narrow money  0.083  0.098 0.009
(0.037) (0.036) (0.053)
Log bank loans  0.248  0.220  0.144
(0.044) (0.047) (0.055)
Log bank assets  0.156  0.144  0.258
(0.035) (0.038) (0.050)
Log real GDP  0.041  0.018  0.079
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
Log real investment  0.190  0.115  0.257
(0.091) (0.089) (0.049)
Log price level  0.089  0.055 0.007
(0.025) (0.026) (0.029)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels denoted by  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.10.
Butthisresultbegsanewquestion: whyareoutputlossessolargetodaydespitemoreactivistpolicies
and the presence of deposit insurance? Some other forces might be at work here. Governments have
made more efforts since the 1930s to prevent negative feedback loops in the economy and have sought
to cushion the real and nominal impact of ﬁnancial crises through policy activism. But at the same time
the ﬁnancial sector has grown and increased leverage, expanding the size of the threat even as the policy
defences have been strengthened. As a result the shocks hitting the ﬁnancial sector might now have a
potentially larger impact on the real economy, absent the policy response. Still, a complete diagnosis has
torecognizethepotentialreversecausalitytoo: itisanopenquestiontowhatextentimplicitgovernment
insurance and the prospect of rescue operations have in turn contributed to the spectacular growth of
ﬁnance and leverage within the system, creating more of the very hazards they were intending to solve.
5 Credit Booms and Financial Crises
In the previous sections we have documented the rise of credit and discussed how activist monetary pol-
icy responses to crises could have been a factor behind the uninterrupted growth of leverage in the post-
war ﬁnancial system. We now look at the sources of recurrent ﬁnancial instability in modern economies.
More speciﬁcally, we want to know whether the ﬁnancial system itself can create economic instability
through endogenous lending booms. In other words, are ﬁnancial crises “credit booms gone wrong”?
Bylookingattheroleofthecreditsystemasapotentialsourceofﬁnancialinstability—andnotmerely
as an ampliﬁer of shocks as the ﬁnancial accelerator theory has it—we implicitly also ask a different
questionabouttheimportanceofcreditintheconductofmonetarypolicy. Thepre-crisisNewKeynesian
consensus held that money and credit have essentially no constructive role to play in monetary policy.
Hence, central bankers were to set interest rates in response to inﬂation and the output gap, with no
meaningfuladditionalinformationcomingfromcreditormonetaryaggregates. Yetevenbeforethecrisis
of 2008–09 this view did not go unchallenged. A number of dissenters argued that money and credit
aggregatesprovidedvaluableinformationforpolicymakersaimingforﬁnancialandeconomicstability.11
11Some argued that excessive credit created “imbalances” and a risk of ﬁnancial instability (e.g., Borio and Philip Lowe 2002,
13On this point, one could also detect echoes of other recent research pointing to a tentative relationship
between credit booms and ﬁnancial fragility in studies of emerging market crises.12
The idea that ﬁnancial crises are credit booms gone wrong is not new. The story underlies the oft-
cited works of Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978), and it has been put forward as a factor in the
current cycle (Hume and Sentance 2009; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) as well as in the Great Depression
(Eichengreen and Mitchener 2003). Yet statistical evidence is still relatively scant. A number of previous
studies has established that systemic ﬁnancial crises tend to be preceded by rapid expansion of credit
(McKinnon and Huw Pill 1997; Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999; Gourinchas et al. 2001). This explanation
appears as a somewhat robust element in descriptions of emerging-market crises; but evidence that the
same problem afﬂicts advanced countries has not yet attained a consensus position, partly due to the
small sample sizes provided by recent history, an inconclusive situation which we can hope to rectify.
Our contribution to this literature is twofold. First, our sample consist of long-run data for 14 de-
veloped economies, in contrast to the focus of much of the recent literature on the experience of de-
veloping countries where ﬁnancial crises are often linked to currency instability or sovereign debt prob-
lems. A pure developed-country sample is also arguably less affected by the institutional weaknesses and
credibility questions that emerging markets tend to face. Second, our focus is clearly on the long-run.
Our cross-country dataset spans 140 years of economic history. Moving beyond explorations of selected
eventsandtheexperienceofthepast30or40years,ourinterestisinwhetherthereissystematicevidence
for credit-growth induced ﬁnancial instability in history. If we can ﬁnd such a link, then the argument for
the credit boom-and-bust story will be strengthened. In this respect, our work follows in the footsteps of
recent long-run comparative work by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and others. However, a key innovation
here is that our new dataset enables us to work with detailed ﬁnancial and other macroeconomic data on
anannualbasis, includingdata(e.g., bankloansandassets)thathaveneverbeencollectedorexploredin
previous research. As a consequence, we can study the determinants and temporal dynamics of ﬁnancial
crises in considerably greater detail than before. In this respect, our work is more closely related to the
analyses of lending booms focusing on recent decades (e.g., Gourinchas et al. 2001).
To test for this link we propose to use a basic forecasting framework to ask a simple question: does
a country’s recent history of credit growth help predict a ﬁnancial crisis, and is this robust to different
speciﬁcations, samples, and control variables? Formally, we use our long-run annual data for 12 coun-
tries, and estimate a probabilistic model of a ﬁnancial crisis event in country i, in year t, as a function of
a lagged information at year t, in one of two forms,
OLS Linear Probability: pit =b0i +b1(L)DlogCREDITit +b2(L)Xit +eit,
Logit: logit(pit)=b0i +b1(L)DlogCREDITit +b2(L)Xit +eit,
where logit(p) = ln(p=(1 p) is the log of the odds ratio and L is the lag operator. The CREDIT variable
will usually be deﬁned as our total bank loans variable deﬂated by the CPI. The lag polynominal b1(L),
which contains only lag orders greater than or equal to 1, will be the main object of study and the goal
will be to investigate whether the lags of credit growth are informative. The lag polynominal b2(L) will,
2003; Borio and William R. White 2003; White 2006; Charles A. E. Goodhart 2007). Recent theories show how a credit signal
might dampen suboptimal business-cycle volatility (Lawrence J. Christiano et al. 2007).
12On the whole, the early-warning literature on banking crises focuses mainly on (i) emerging markets and (ii) factors other
than lending booms (for a survey see Eichengreen and Carlos Arteta, 2002 Table 3.1). Exceptions, which use data from recent
decades only, include Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache (1998); Graciela L. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Pierre-
Olivier Gourinchas et al. (2001). Particularly relevant works are those by Borio and Lowe (2002, 2003), who like us focus on
cumulative effects and place a high weight on the lagged credit growth signal.
14Table 3: Financial Crisis Prediction—OLS and Logit Estimates
Speciﬁcaton (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit
Fixed effects None Country Country+year None Country
L. log (loans/P) -0.0281 -0.0273 -0.0489 -0.257 -0.398
(0.0812) (0.0815) (0.0801) (2.077) (2.110)
L2. log (loans/P) 0.301 0.302 0.320 6.956 7.138
(0.0869) (0.0872) (0.0833) (2.308) (2.631)
L3. log (loans/P) 0.0486 0.0478 0.00134 1.079 0.888
(0.0850) (0.0853) (0.0819) (2.826) (2.948)
L4. log (loans/P) 0.00494 0.00213 0.0346 0.290 0.203
(0.0811) (0.0814) (0.0782) (1.282) (1.378)
L5. log (loans/P) 0.0979 0.0928 0.136 2.035 1.867
(0.0746) (0.0752) (0.0729) (1.607) (1.640)
Observations 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,272 1,272
Groups 14 14 14 14 14
Sum of lag coefﬁcients 0.425 0.417 0.443 10.10 9.697
s.e. 0.123 0.126 0.136 2.590 2.920
Test for all lags = 0† 4.061 3.871 4.328 24.95 17.23
p value 0.00116 0.00174 0.000661 0.000143 0.00408
Test for country effects = 0† — 0.71 0.84 — 7.67
p value — 0.754 0.617 — 0.864
Test for year effects = 0† — — 4.15 — —
p value — — 0.0001 — —
R2†† 0.016 0.023 0.290 0.0434 0.0659
Pseudolikelihood — — — -210.8 -205.8
Overall test statistics† 4.061 1.638 4.184 24.95 36.21
p value 0.0012 0.0445 0.00001 0.000143 0.00663
AUROC 0.673 0.720 0.952 0.673 0.717
s.e. 0.0357 0.0341 0.00865 0.0360 0.0349
Note: † Reported statistic is F for OLS, 2 for logit. †† Reported statistic is Pseudo R2 for Logit. Standard errors in
parentheses. Logit standard errors are robust. Signiﬁcance levels denoted by  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.10.
if present, allow us to control for other possible causal factors in the form of additional variables in the
vector X. The error term eit is assumed to be well behaved.
We ﬁrst present some simple variants of these models in Table 3. These results take the form of an
estimateoftheaboveequationswithnoadditionalcontrols,sothatthetermXisomitted. Inthislongand
narrowpanelthereare1,272observationsover14countries,withanaverageofabout91observationsper
country. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when there is a ﬁnancial crisis according to
our deﬁnitions, and otherwise zero. Our crisis deﬁnitions are the same as detailed above.
To keep the lag structure reasonable, we consider up to ﬁve annual lags of any regressor.13 Model
speciﬁcation 1 presents an OLS Linear Probability model with simple pooled data. Model speciﬁcation 2
adds country ﬁxed effects to the OLS model, but these are not statistically signiﬁcant (p =0.75). Keeping
country effects, model speciﬁcation 3 then adds year effects to OLS, and these are highly statistically sig-
13Formal lag selection procedures (AIC, BIC, and likelihood ratio tests) suggest we could in most cases use just two lags of
CREDIT; however higher order lags are sometimes signiﬁcant, as can be seen in Table 2, and credit booms are typically consid-
ered phenomena that last for many years, so we maintain 5 lags as our initial speciﬁcation.
15niﬁcant. What does this say? It implies that there is a common global time component driving ﬁnancial
crises—and, if you happen to know ex ante this effect, you can use it to dramatically enhance your ability
to predict crises. This is not too surprising given the consensus view that ﬁnancial crises have tended to
happen in waves and often afﬂict multiple countries, but is also not of very much practical import for
out-of-sample forecasting, since such time effects are not known ex ante. Thus, from now on, given our
focus on prediction, we study only models without time effects.
In all of the OLS models the sum of the lag coefﬁcients is about 0.40, which is easy to interpret. Aver-
age real loan growth over 5 years in this sample has a standard deviation of about 0.07, so a one standard
deviation change in real loan growth increases the probability of a crisis by about 0.0280, or 2.8 percent-
age points. Since the sample frequency of crises is just under 4 percent, this shows a high sensitivity of
crises to plausible shocks within the empirical range of observed loan growth disturbances.
Still, there are well known problems with the Linear Probability model, notably the fact that the do-
main of its ﬁtted values is not constrained to the unit interval relevant for a probability outcome. Thus
in columns 4 and 5 we switch to a Logit model. Model speciﬁcation 4 displays pooled Logit, and speci-
ﬁcation 5 adds country ﬁxed effects by including dummies in the regression, though again these are not
statistically signiﬁcant. Unfortunately, we cannot implement a Logit model with year effects. In our set-
ting, the problem is small N and large T, the opposite of typical microeconometric applications. This
means that the incidental parameters problem afﬂicts the T dimension, and we have consistency in N.
Conditional ﬁxed effects can only be estimated using years in the panel where there is actual variation
in the outcome variable. In our case, this collapses the number of observations from 1,272 to just 140,
so that model parameters could not be precisely estimated. We accordingly adopt Column 5, the Logit
model with country effects but without time-effects, as our preferred baseline speciﬁcation henceforth.
Our key ﬁnding is that all forms of the model show that a credit boom over the previous ﬁve years
is indicative of a heightened risk of a ﬁnancial crisis. The diagnostic tests reported show that the ﬁve
lags are jointly statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level; the regression 2 is also signiﬁcant. The difference
between the ﬁrst and second lag coefﬁcients is also suggestive; the former is negative and the latter large
and positive, conﬁrming that when the second derivative of credit changes sign we can see that trouble
is likely to follow (Biggs et al. 2009). The sum of the lag coefﬁcients is about 10, and also statistically
signiﬁcant. To interpret this we need to convert to marginal effects, where in Column 5, at the means of
all variables, the sum of the marginal effects over all lags is 0.301, similar, albeit a little smaller, than the
0.40 estimate given by the OLS Linear Probability model noted above.
Finally we note that in all its forms the model has predictive power, as judged by a standard tool used
to evaluate binary classiﬁcation ability, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. This is shown
in Figure 7 for our preferred baseline model. The curve plots the true positive rate TP(c) against the false
positiverate FP(c), forallthresholds c onthe realline, wherethe binaryclassiﬁer is I(^ p c >0), I(.) is the
indicator function, and ^ p is the linear prediction of the model which forms a continuous signal. When
the threshold c gets large and negative, the classiﬁer is very aggressive in making crisis calls, almost all
signals are above the threshold, and TP and FP converge to 1; conversely, when c gets large and positive,
the classiﬁer is very conservative in making crisis calls, almost all signals are below the threshold, and TP
and FP converge to 0. In between, an informative classiﬁer should deliver TP > FP so the ROC curve
should be above the 45-degree line of the null, uninformative (or “coin toss”) classiﬁer.
At this point we would prefer not to take a stand on where the policy maker would place the cutoff
valueofthethreshold. Theutilitycomputationdependsoncostsofdifferentoutcomesandthefrequency
of crises. For example, the cutoff should be more aggressive if the cost of an undiagnosed crisis is high,
but less so if the cost of a false alarm is higher. If crises are rare, the threshold bar should also be raised
































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (Baseline Model)
exists that is independent of the policymaker’s cutoff. This is the area under the ROC curve (AUROC). It is
essentially a test of whether the distribution of the model’s signals are signiﬁcantly different under crisis
and noncrisis states, thus allowing them to use a basis for meaningfully classifying these outcomes. The
AUROC provides a simple test against the null value of 0.5 with an asymptotic normal distribution, and
for our baseline model AUROC = 0.717 with a standard error of just 0.0349. The model can therefore be
judged to have predictive power versus a coin toss, although it is far from a perfect classiﬁer which would
have AUROC = 1.14
All the above forecasts suffer from in-sample look-ahead bias, even though they use lagged data. To
put our model to a sterner test, we limited the forecast sample to the post-1983 period only (350 country-
year observations) and compared in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts (the former based on full sam-
plepredictions, withlook-aheadbias; thelatterbasedonrollingregressions, usinglaggeddataonly). The
in-sample forecast produced an even higher AUROC = 0.763 (s.e. = 0.0635), but the out-of-sample also
proved informative, with an AUROC = 0.646 (s.e. = 0.0695), the latter having statistical signiﬁcance at
better than the 5% level. We think any predictive power is impressive at this stage given the general skep-
ticism evinced by the “early warning” literature, and our out-of-sample results add some reassurance.
14Is 0.7 a “high” AUROC? For comparison, in the medical ﬁeld where ROCs are widely used for binary classiﬁcation, an infor-
mal survey of newly published prostate cancer diagnostic tests ﬁnds AUROCs of about 0.75.
17We now ask some questions about the value added of our results and their robustness. The ﬁrst claim
we make is that the use of credit aggregates, rather than monetary aggregates, is of crucial importance.
This would have broad implications, ﬁrst for economic history, since monetary aggregates have been
widely collected and may be easily put to use. But it also has policy implications. Indeed, after the crisis
of 2008–09 the argument has often been heard that greater attention to such aggregates, in contrast to
a narrow focus on the Taylor rule indicators of output and inﬂation, might have averted the crisis. But
when we look at the long run data systematically, monetary aggregates are not that useful as predictive
tools in forecasting crises, in contrast to the correct measure, total credit. We ﬁnd the success of the
creditmeasureappealing,andnotjustbecauseitvindicatesthedrudgeryofourlaboriousdatacollection
efforts: wethinkcreditisasuperiorpredictor,becauseitbettercapturesimportant,time-varyingfeatures
of bank balance sheets such as leverage and non-monetary liabilities. The basis for these claims is the
collection of results reported in Tables 4 and 5.
In Table 4 we start with the baseline model, reproduced in speciﬁcation 6. All through this table we
continue to estimate the model over the entire sample, using a Logit model with country ﬁxed effects.
Havingsettledonthismodel, wenowalsoreport, forcompleteness, themarginaleffectsonthepredicted
probability evaluated at the means for the lags of credit. We then take several perturbations of the base-
line that take the form of replacing the ﬁve lags of credit with alternative measures of money and credit.
Speciﬁcation 7 replaces real loans with real broad money, still deﬂated by CPI. The ﬁt is still statis-
tically signiﬁcant, although slightly weaker judging from lower R2, and predictive power – the AUROC
is also marginally lower. However, the basic message at this point is that broad money could poten-
tially proxy for credit. Both the liability and the asset side of banks’ balance sheets seem to do a good
job at predicting ﬁnancial trouble ahead over the whole sample—though we shall qualify this result in a
moment. Speciﬁcation 8 replaces loans with narrow money and the model falls apart, which is not un-
expected; given the instability in the money multiplier, the disconnect between base money and credit
conditions is too great to expect this model to succeed. Speciﬁcations 9 and 10 replace real loans with
the loans-to-GDP ratio and the loans-to-broad-money ratio, respectively. Both of these variants of the
model also meet with some success, and speciﬁcation 9 outperforms slightly in terms of measures of ﬁt
and predictive ability as measured by AUROC.
Sofarthemainresultsmighttemptustoconjecture, ﬁrst, thatvariousscalingsofcreditvolumecould
have similar power to predict ﬁnancial crises; and, second, that broad money could also proxy for credit
adequately well. The former idea may be true, but Table 5 quickly dispels the latter. The robustness
checks here take the form of splitting the sample into pre-WW2 and post-WW2 samples, where we are
guided to conduct this test by the summary ﬁndings above showing very different trends in the behavior
of money and credit in these two epochs.
Speciﬁcations 11 and 12 show that using our credit measure, real loans, the baseline model performs
quite well in terms of both ﬁt and predictive power both before and after WW2. Column 12 is particu-
larly interesting, since the signiﬁcant and alternating signs of the ﬁrst and second lag coefﬁcients in the
postwar period highlight the sign of the second derivative (not the ﬁrst) in raising the risk of a crisis. In
contrast, speciﬁcations 13 and 14 expose some unsatisfactory performance when broad money is used.
Before WW2 the weaknesses are not evident, with the lags of broad money still signiﬁcant, and similar
predictive power. But after WW2 the model based on broad money is a failure: the ﬁt is much poorer, and
from a predictive standpoint the model has a much lower AUROC.
To explore the predictive ability differences more closely, we examined the ROC curves for speciﬁca-
tions 11–14 as shown in Figure 8, this time computed on common samples within each period (thus the
statistics differ slightly from those in Table 5). We used AUROC comparison tests along with Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests (of the difference in the signal distributions under each outcome) to see whether one
18Table 4: Baseline Model and Alternative Measures of Money and Credit
Speciﬁcation (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(Logit country effects) Baseline Replace Replace Replace Replace
loans with loans with real loans with real loans with
broad narrow loans/ loans/
money money GDP broad money
L. log (loans/P)  0.398  1.051  2.504 2.091 0.601
 2.11  2.771  1.806  2.235  2.383
L2. log (loans/P) 7.138 5.773 2.303 7.627 5.842
 2.631  2.181  1.781  2.135  2.327
L3. log (loans/P) 0.888 3.515 1.768 3.569 2.092
 2.948  2.329  1.664  2.386  2.048
L4. log (loans/P) 0.203  1.535  2.880 2.333 1.613
 1.378  2.287  1.51  1.405  1.766
L5. log (loans/P) 1.867 3.077 1.373 3.164 0.497
 1.64  2.256  1.63  1.583  2.37
Marginal effects -0.0124 -0.0350 -0.0888 0.0598 0.0196
at each lag 0.222 0.192 0.0817 0.218 0.190
evaluated at the means 0.0276 0.117 0.0627 0.102 0.0681
0.00629 -0.0511 -0.102 0.0668 0.0525
0.0580 0.102 0.0487 0.0905 0.0162
Sum 0.301 0.326 0.00211 0.538 0.346
Observations 1,272 1,348 1,381 1,245 1,224
Groups 14 14 14 14 14
Sum of lag coefﬁcients 9.697 9.779 0.0596 18.78 10.65
s.e. 2.920 3.400 3.240 3.651 4.053
Test for all lags = 0, 2 17.23 17.77 6.557 29.85 10.62
p value 0.00408 0.00324 0.256 0.000016 0.0594
Test for country effects = 0, 2 7.674 8.755 8.834 8.012 9.140
p value 0.864 0.791 0.785 0.843 0.762
Pseudo R2 0.0659 0.0487 0.0381 0.0923 0.0497
Pseudolikelihood -205.8 -224.6 -237.4 -198.9 -201.5
Overall test statistic, 2 36.21 36.81 17.37 47.77 19.82
p value 0.00663 0.00555 0.498 0.000163 0.343
Predictive ability, AUROC 0.717 0.681 0.631 0.743 0.680
s.e. 0.0349 0.0294 0.0339 0.0337 0.0378
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels denoted by  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.10.
model or the other was to be preferred in each period for its binary classiﬁcation ability. Before WW2
(for N = 486 common observations) a test of equality in AUROCs between the credit and money models
passed easily (p = 0.37); the ROC curves are very close to each other and almost overlapping; and both
models attain a maximum height above the diagonal that is signiﬁcantly different from zero. After WW2
(for N =700 common observations) the money model ROC curve is below the credit model ROC curve at
almost all points, except at a few points close to the (0,0) and (1,1) points, where operation is unlikely to
be optimal for the policymaker; the two AUROCs are different, with a p-value of 0.237. We also ﬁnd that
of the four ROCs in Figure 8, only the Post-WW2 money model fails the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, so its
maximal height above the diagonal (TP minus FP) is not statistically different from zero at conventional















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: ROC Comparisons of Money and Credit as Predictors: Prewar versus Postwar
20Table 5: Baseline Model with Pre-WW2 and Post-WW2 Samples
Speciﬁcation (11) (12) (13) (14)
(Logit country effects) Baseline Baseline Pre-WW2 Post-WW2
pre-WW2 post-WW2 sample replace sample replace
sample sample loans with loans with
using loans using loans broad money broad money
L. log (loans/P) 2.249 -0.316 -0.227 2.705
(2.362) (3.005) (3.014) (4.438)
L2. log (loans/P) 7.697 8.307 7.393 4.719
(3.221) (2.497) (3.004) (2.375)
L3. log (loans/P) 2.890 2.946 4.077 4.060
(3.056) (2.687) (2.915) (2.170)
L4. log (loans/P) 2.486 0.755 -0.249 -0.838
(1.587) (2.623) (1.982) (5.359)
L5. log (loans/P) 4.260 -1.749 4.844 0.808
(1.735) (3.204) (2.647) (4.016)
Observations 510 706 585 708
Groups 13 14 13 14
Marginal effects 0.0873 -0.00642 -0.0102 0.0617
at each lag 0.299 0.169 0.332 0.108
evaluated at the means 0.112 0.0598 0.183 0.0926
0.0965 0.0153 -0.0112 -0.0191
0.165 -0.0355 0.218 0.0184
Sum 0.760 0.202 0.711 0.261
Sum of lag coefﬁcients 19.58 9.943 15.84 11.45
s.e. 4.921 6.056 5.119 6.022
Test for all lags = 0, 2 19.20 12.44 13.53 12.13
p value 0.00176 0.0292 0.0189 0.0330
Test for country effects = 0, 2 6.369 5.348 11.74 5.917
p value 0.932 0.945 0.549 0.920
Pseudo R2 0.130 0.0771 0.0855 0.0476
Pseudolikelihood -106.4 -83.97 -126.2 -86.71
Overall test statistic, 2 40.21 36.44 35.95 19.89
p value 0.00195 0.00401 0.00716 0.280
AUROC 0.763 0.718 0.728 0.659
s.e. 0.0391 0.0691 0.0361 0.0600
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels denoted by  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.10.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. In the prewar sample NLD is dropped from the logit regression because
there are no crises in the sample (with ﬁve lags of credit or money in non-war years), so N =13 for these cases.
How do we interpret these results? The ﬁndings mesh well with our overall understanding of the dra-
matic changes in money and credit dynamics after the Great Depression. In the summary data for the
pre-WW2 sample, we saw how broad money and credit moved hand in hand, so that a Friedman “money
view”oftheﬁnancialsystem,focusingontheliabilitysideofbanks’balancesheets,wasanadequatesim-
pliﬁcation. AfterWW2thiswasnolongerthecase,andcreditwasdelinkedfrombroadmoneyaggregates,
which would beg the question as to which was the more important aggregate in driving macroeconomic
outcomes. At least with respect to crises, the results of our analysis are clear: credit matters, not money.
These ﬁndings have potentially important policy implications, especially for central banks that still
embrace the oft-forgotten idea of using quantitative indicators as a “pillar” of monetary policymaking. If
21this pillar is there as to support price stability goals, then indeed a monetary aggregate may be the right
tool for the job; but if ﬁnancial stability is a goal, then our results suggest that a better pillar might make
use of credit aggregates instead and their superior power in predicting incipient crises.
6 Robustness Tests
To underscore the value of our model based on the “credit view” and to guard against omitted variable
bias,inTable6wesubjectourbaselinespeciﬁcationtoseveralperturbationsthattaketheformofinclud-
ing additional control variables X as described above. Speciﬁcation 15 adds 5 lags of real GDP growth.
Speciﬁcation 16 adds 5 lags of the inﬂation rate, since inﬂation has been found to contribute to crises in
some studies (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). Neither set of controls can raise the ﬁt and
predictive performance of the model substantially. The inclusion of these terms has little effect on the
coefﬁcientsonthelagsofcreditgrowth,theirquantitativeorstatisticalsigniﬁcance,andtheirsubstantive
contribution to the model’s predictive ability. Speciﬁcations 17 and 18 add 5 lags of the nominal short–
term interest rate or its real counterpart, since some studies ﬁnd that high interest rates, e.g., to defend a
peg, can help trigger crises (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). While some of the lags are signiﬁcant at
the 5% level, they do not alter the baseline story and the credit effects remain strong.
In speciﬁcation 19 we add 5 lags of the change in the investment-to-GDP ratio, to explore the possi-
bility that the nature of the credit boom might affect the probability that it ends in a crisis. For example,
according to arguments heard from time to time, if credit is funding “productive investments” then the
chances that something can go wrong are reduced—as compared to credit booms that fuel consumption
binges or feed speculative excess by households, ﬁrms, and/or banks.15 Our results caution against this
rosy view. Over the long run, in our developed country sample, most of the lags of investment are not
statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional level, and the only one that actually has a “wrong” positive
sign, suggesting that crises are slightly more likely when they have been funding investment booms as
opposed to other activity.16 As an additional check, we also tested the interaction of the 5-year moving
average of credit growth with real investment growth. The interaction term was found to be statistically
insigniﬁcant. Interacting the two variables also had virtually no impact on the ﬁt or the predictive power
of the model.17 In brief, when it comes to investment ﬁnance versus consumption ﬁnance, we could not
ﬁnd any conclusive evidence that the nature of the credit boom made any difference. If this is the case,
then the suspicion arises that when banks originate lending, they may be almost equally incapable of
assessing repayment capacity in all cases, with investment loans having no special virtues.
Summing up the results from Table 6, we conjecture that, although some of the auxiliary control vari-
ables may matter in some contexts—perhaps in other samples that include emerging markets—for the
developed economies these other factors are not the main signal of ﬁnancial instability problems. Rather
thekeyindicatorofaproblemisanexcessivecreditboom. Indeed,thesumofthelagloancoefﬁcients(or
theirmarginaleffects)isevenhigherinTable6columns(15)–(19)thaninthebaselinespeciﬁcation(6),so
credit effects are ampliﬁed here, rather than being diminished by the added controls; and the pseudo-R2
values range between 0.0765 and 0.123, compared to the 0.0659 value in the baseline case, showing that
the greater fraction of the model’s ﬁt is always due to the credit terms.
15The argument has often been applied to foreign capital ﬂows manifest in current account deﬁcits. The argument that
capital ﬂowing into investment booms does not matter has been variously stated as the “Lawson doctrine,” “Pitchford critique,”
or “consenting adults view.” See Sebastian Edwards (2002) for a survey of this area.
16The sum of the lags on investment is positive, so crises are marginally more likely in an investment boom, controlling for
credit growth.
17The results are not reported due to space constraints but are available from the authors on request.
22Table 6: Robustness Checks
Speciﬁcation (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
(Logit country effects) Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline
plus plus plus plus plus
5 lags of 5 lags of 5 lags of 5 lags of 5 lags of
real GDP inﬂation nominal short- real short- change in
growth term int. rate term int. rate I=Y
L. log (loans/P) 1.544 -0.771 0.113 -1.458 -0.152
(2.081) (2.362) (2.072) (2.442) (2.250)
L2. log (loans/P) 8.571 10.22 8.491 10.99 7.131
(2.403) (2.690) (2.982) (2.689) (2.845)
L3. log (loans/P) 3.114 -1.590 1.054 -1.258 0.546
(2.347) (2.856) (3.443) (3.239) (3.213)
L4. log (loans/P) 2.555 1.503 0.241 2.686 1.124
(1.441) (1.461) (1.697) (1.673) (1.366)
L5. log (loans/P) 3.539 1.128 1.996 0.821 3.004
(1.555) (1.842) (2.058) (1.820) (1.943)
Observations 1,272 1,272 969 961 1,218
Groups 14 14 14 14 14
Sum of lag coefﬁcients 19.32 10.49 11.89 11.78 11.65
s.e. 4.329 3.121 3.275 3.385 3.404
Test for all lags = 0, 2 28.99 24.45 19.45* 26.54 16.59
p value 0.00002 0.000178 0.00159 0.00007 0.00536
Test lags of added vbl. = 0, 2 34.43 19.55 3.888 14.98 4.895
p value 0.000002 0.00152 0.566 0.0105 0.429
Test for country effects = 0, 2 10.41 8.031 7.727 5.888 8.538
p value 0.660 0.842 0.806 0.922 0.807
Pseudo R2 0.123 0.104 0.0765 0.110 0.0870
Pseudolikelihood -193.3 -197.4 -181.8 -174.9 -196.2
Overall test statistic, 2 61.47 52.23 36.40 47.46 52.38
p value 0.00023 0.000466 0.0275 0.00128 0.000445
AUROC 0.751 0.770 0.725 0.750 0.737
s.e. 0.0432 0.0422 0.0448 0.0454 0.0419
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels denoted by  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.10.
Marginal effects not reported.
In the ﬁnal part of our robustness analysis, we ask whether the inclusion of asset prices and controls
for the level of ﬁnancial development affect our results regarding the role of credit growth in generat-
ing ﬁnancial instability. Asset price boom and bust cycles have a long history that is well documented
(Kindleberger 1978). Also the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–09 was closely linked to the boom and bust of hous-
ing prices in the United States and elsewhere raising the possibility that asset prices play a central role in
the emergence of systemic ﬁnancial crises. Yet one can also think of other asset price booms (the run-up
inthepricesoftechnologystocksbefore2001comestomind)thathavenottriggeredlarge-scaleﬁnancial
instability.
From a monetary policy point of view, recurring asset price booms have led to considerable debate
about their role in setting monetary policy. Until recently, the consensus has been that asset price de-
velopments should only inﬂuence the formulation of monetary policy to the degree that they affect the
central banks’ inﬂation forecast (Bernanke and Gertler 2001). However, in the light of recent events, a
23more granular assessment of asset bubbles has been suggested (Mishkin 2008). The key distinction here
is that asset price bubbles that are not accompanied by increased leverage against higher asset values
might not pose particular stability risks for the ﬁnancial system. However, if booming asset prices relax
collateral constraints which in turn feed more lending and higher prices, ﬁnancial stability risks could be
elevated. As the positive feedback loop between asset values and lending reverses, the balance sheets of
ﬁnancial intermediaries and households can come under severe strain.
As a ﬁrst step to disentangle these issues empirically, we include stock price data into our regressions
and test if they increase the predictive power of the model. In the context of our long-run cross-country
sample stock market indices are the only available indicator for asset market developments. Data avail-
ability and comparability problems make the use of house price data impossible. If the inclusion of stock
prices into our regression yields strong predictive signals, this would be evidence that stock price booms
per se pose ﬁnancial stability risks. Later on, we will also use interaction terms to test whether the ﬁ-
nancial risks emanating from stock price booms depend on credit levels or the pace of credit creation.
To create the database of long-run stock prices in the 14 countries in our sample we started with stan-
dard sources (e.g., Global Financial Data), and then, thanks to the help of a number of colleagues, we
were able to extend our dataset and include extended time series of historical equity market indices for
France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden that have become available in recent years.18
The results are shown in Table 7. In speciﬁcation 20 we add ﬁve lags of changes in nominal stock
prices to our baseline, in regression 21 we add changes in real (CPI-deﬂated) stock prices. The overall
results of these additive models are mixed. The lags of nominal stock prices are insigniﬁcant, but reach
signiﬁcance at the 5% level in the case of real prices. The predictive ability of the model as measured by
the AUROC rises slightly from 0.717 to 0.731. The pseudo-R2 remains in 0.09 range, demonstrating that
the greatest fraction of the ﬁt of the model still comes from the credit terms which remain highly signiﬁ-
cant in all speciﬁcations. While asset prices contain some additional information about the likelihood of
future crises, their overall contribution is relatively small. From a policy perspective, the key variable to
watch is credit.
Before we turn to possible interaction effects, we address a related set of issues in speciﬁcations 22
and 23 in Table 7. We ask whether there is evidence that crises are more likely in larger ﬁnancial systems
(as proxied by the credit to GDP ratio) as compared to times when the level of ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion is lower. As we employ country ﬁxed effects throughout, we are effectively asking whether the crisis
probability is greater in times when the credit to GDP ratio is high relative to the country average. One
could hypothesize that such a positive relationship might stem from the fact that more complex ﬁnan-
cial systems and more highly leveraged economies have a greater propensity for disruptions in the face
of shocks. But also a political economy explanation is possible. Excessive risk taking and moral hazard
problems could become more endemic if the ﬁnancial sector grows relative to the size of the economy.
Lookingattheseissuesfromapurelyempiricalpointofview,someevidenceemergesthatcrisisprob-
abilities grow with ﬁnancial depth. In speciﬁcation 22 we include the credit to GDP ratio. This leads to an
immediate increase of the AUROC by about 2 points relative to the baseline. The level of credit to GDP
is also signiﬁcant if both stock prices and credit levels are included in speciﬁcation 23. Also the pseudo-
R2 of the regression increases by some margin indicating a slightly better ﬁt. While the importance and
signiﬁcance of the credit growth remains unaffected, our long-run sample data suggest that the risk of ﬁ-
nancial crises grows with a higher credit to GDP level. This analysis therefore provides some quantitative
evidence to back up the claim that larger, more complex ﬁnancial systems may be inherently more risky,
18While the coverage is generally good for the twentieth century, nineteenth century price data are harder to come by. We
are indebted to Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur (France), Peter Koudijs (Netherlands), Angelo Riva (Italy) and Daniel Waldenström
(Sweden)forsharingtheirdatawithus. JanToreKlovland, KevinO’Rourke, andHans-JoachimVothdirectedustoothersources.
24Table 7: Credit, Asset Prices, and Financial Development
Speciﬁcation (20) (21) (22) (23)
(Logit country effects) Baseline plus Baseline plus Baseline plus Baseline plus
5 lags of 5 lags of Loans 5 lags of
nominal stock real stock over real stock prices
price change price change GDP plus loans/GDP
L. log (loans/P) -2.491 -2.540 -0.755 -3.392
(2.324) (2.312) (2.293) (2.470)
L2. log (loans/P) 7.316 7.165 7.599 7.848
(2.910) (2.915) (2.871) (3.215)
L3. log (loans/P) 3.405 3.185 0.720 3.297
(2.899) (2.864) (3.307) (3.171)
L4. log (loans/P) -1.352 -1.684 0.0933 -1.747
(1.521) (1.539) (1.497) (1.669)
L5. log (loans/P) 1.678 1.771 2.326 2.460
(1.835) (1.784) (1.784) (1.994)
L1. log (stock prices) -1.046 -0.865 -0.768
(0.464) (0.434) (0.455)
L2. log (stock prices) 0.535 0.563 0.550
(0.644) (0.673) (0.666)
L3. log (stock prices) 0.272 0.715 0.691
(0.651) (0.692) (0.690)
L4. log (stock prices) 0.954 1.098 1.024
(0.822) (0.811) (0.814)
L5. log (stock prices) 0.0844 0.467 0.438
(0.631) (0.703) (0.627)
Loans/GDP (log) 1.100 1.601
(0.624) (0.703)
Observations 1,061 1,062 1,271 1,061
Groups 14 14 14 14
Sum of lag coefﬁcients 8.557 7.898 9.984 8.466
s.e. 3.468 3.443 2.918 3.460
Test for all lags = 0, 2 22.04 20.65 17.45 21.19
p value 0.000515 0.000944 0.00371 0.000747
Test lags of added vbl. = 0, 2 8.664 13.28 11.89
p value 0.123 0.0209 0.0363
Test for country effects = 0, 2 5.499 5.433 11.43 10.33
p value 0.939 0.942 0.575 0.587
Pseudo R2 0.0882 0.0901 0.0749 0.108
Pseudolikelihood -169.8 -169.5 -203.8 -166.2
Overall test statistic, 2 39.65 46.84 41.48 47.20
p value 0.0119 0.00154 0.00208 0.00212
AUROC 0.727 0.731 0.731 0.764
s.e. 0.0399 0.0383 0.0379 0.0358
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels denoted by  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.10.
Marginal effects not reported.
25e.g., as argued in the prescient paper by Raghuram G. Rajan (2005).
Whataboutinteractioneffects? Areassetpriceboomsmoredangerouswhentheyoccurathighcredit
to GDP levels or when they coincide with elevated rates of credit growth in the economy? Do these inter-
actions force us to modify our core ﬁnding about the role of accelerations in credit creation as the prime
suspect in causing ﬁnancial instability? In order to keep the number of interaction terms manageable,
wenowuse5-yearmovingaverages(thewindowexcludesthecurrentobservation)andtheirinteractions
to explain the occurrence of a ﬁnancial crisis. We start in Table 8, in speciﬁcation 24, with a simple repli-
cation of our baseline model, relating the likelihood of a ﬁnancial crisis to the rate of real credit growth
in the ﬁve preceding. This 5-year moving average model matches our previous ﬁndings. Credit growth
clearly helps predict ﬁnancial crises. While the predictive ability of the model is (unsurprisingly) a little
lowerthaninthefullyspeciﬁedmodelwithﬁvelags, theAUROCreachesastillrespectable0.663(stillsig-
niﬁcantly different from 0.5). In speciﬁcation 26, we test for the impact of asset price booms conditional
on credit growth. Including real stock prices plus the interaction of stock prices and credit growth does
not meaningfully improve the predictive ability. The AUROC rises slightly to 0.669 and the ﬁt does not
rise meaningfully either. The interaction of credit growth and asset prices yields a statistically insigniﬁ-
cant negative coefﬁcient estimate on the interaction term. We are working with 5-year moving averages,
so that this result could be partly due to the lags involved. When credit growth is strong and stock prices
are rising during the boom phase, the risk of a crisis is low. Once the interaction term turns negative, i.e.,
when stock prices start falling or credit growth reverses, the odds increase. This accords with the view
of Mishkin (2008) and others that it is the unwinding of leverage-driven asset bubbles that puts ﬁnancial
stability most at risk, posing a serious challenge for central banks.
In speciﬁcation 28 we add credit to GDP and the interaction of credit growth and credit to GDP ratios.
Predictive ability rises, but the interaction term is clearly insigniﬁcant. The impact of credit growth on
ﬁnancial crisis risks is not conditional on the size of the ﬁnancial sector. Yet we ﬁnd again that ﬁnancial
stability risks seem to increase independently with larger ﬁnancial systems. This is shown in a higher
predictive ability of the model which stems from adding information about the size of the ﬁnancial sec-
tor, not from interaction effects with credit growth (27). When we run the identical model without the
interaction term we ﬁnd that ﬁt, predictive ability and the coefﬁcients on credit growth and levels are
virtually unchanged. In light of 140 years of data, larger ﬁnancial sectors (relative to long-run country
means) appear to make for more crisis-prone economies. Further research is clearly needed to explore
the causal relationships.
YetwhiletheeffectofcreditboomsdoesnotseemtobeconditionalonhighcredittoGDPratios,there
are reasons to think that stock price booms and busts are more dangerous if they occur in highly ﬁnan-
cializedeconomies. Inspeciﬁcation29,wethereforeintroduceaninteractiontermofstockpricechanges
and credit to GDP levels, in addition to controls for credit growth, stock price trends and the size of the
ﬁnancial system. In other words, we are asking whether asset booms are more problematic in highly de-
veloped ﬁnancial systems. The answer from a 140 years of historical data is afﬁrmative. Both predictive
abilityandﬁtimproveconsiderably,whilethecoefﬁcientonthestockpriceincreasefallsstrongly. Condi-
tional onlow creditto GDP levels, stock pricebooms are inconsequential. But therisks growwith the size
of the ﬁnancial sector. It is also worth adding that across these regressions credit growth remains highly
signiﬁcant, conﬁrming our key result that accelerations of credit growth are a key variable to watch from
a policy perspective.
To conclude, a predictive analysis of our large long-term, cross-country dataset lends support to the
idea that, for the most part, ﬁnancial crises throughout modern history can be viewed as credit booms
gone wrong. From our regressions, past growth of credit emerges as the single best predictor of future
ﬁnancial instability, a result which is robust to the inclusion of various other nominal and real variables.
26Table 8: Credit, Asset Prices and Financial Development—Interactions
Speciﬁcation (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29)
(Logit country effects) Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline
5-year moving average of: plus plus plus plus plus
 log (loans/P) 5.340 5.012 7.526 6.752 6.632 7.370
(2.069) (2.288) (2.464) (2.012) (2.243) (2.368)
 log (stocks/P) 0.524 2.704 0.236
(1.391) (2.103) (1.464)
 log (loans/P) x  log (stocks/P) -22.77
(14.19)
Loans/GDP (log) 1.432 1.515 1.704
(0.530) (0.751) (0.615)
 log (loans/P) x loans/GDP (log) -1.243
(8.516)
 log (stocks/P) x loans/GDP (log) 4.661
(3.401)
Observations 1,278 1,278 1,278 1,437 1,437 1,278
Groups 14 14 14 14 14 14
Test for country effects = 0, 2 7.447 7.528 7.980 15.58 14.58 16.21
p value 0.878 0.873 0.845 0.272 0.334 0.238
Pseudo R2 0.0348 0.0351 0.0407 0.0456 0.0457 0.0652
Pseudolikelihood -203.7 -203.7 -202.5 -246.8 -246.8 -197.3
Overall test statistic, 2 17.58 18.47 22.95 35.78 35.71 30.92
p value 0.227 0.239 0.115 0.00190 0.00317 0.0205
AUROC 0.663 0.662 0.669 0.689 0.689 0.714
s.e. 0.0392 0.0385 0.0369 0.0368 0.0367 0.0371
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels denoted by  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.10.
Marginal effects not reported.
Moreover, credit growth seems a better indicator than its nearest rival measure, broad money growth,
especially in the postwar period. In light of the structural changes of the ﬁnancial system that we doc-
umented above, this comes as no surprise. As credit growth has increasingly decoupled from money
growth, credit and money aggregates are no longer two sides of the same coin. This brings us back to
the crucial questions raised at the beginning of this section—should central banks pay attention to credit
aggregates or conﬁne themselves to following inﬂation targeting rules? Historical evidence suggests that
credit has a constructive role to play in central bank policy. Valuable information about macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial stability would be missed if policymakers chose to ignore the behavior of credit aggregates,
although how this information is included in the overall policy and regulatory regime, and via which
instruments, is an open and much debated question.
Yet two other potentially important insights emerged from our long-run perspective on the determi-
nants of ﬁnancial crises. First, with regard to the effects of asset price booms and busts, our empirical
analysis demonstrated that stock market booms become more problematic with larger ﬁnancial sectors.
At early stages of ﬁnancial development, run-ups in equity markets are much less dangerous. Second,
in the light of 140 years of ﬁnancial crises the evidence suggests that larger ﬁnancial sectors are more
crisis prone. While the underlying causes remain in the dark—possibly fragility effects of growing com-
plexity, increased moral hazard in more ﬁnancialized economies, or lax regulation as a reason of both a
larger ﬁnancial system and frequent ﬁnancial crises—this empirical ﬁnding deserves further dedicated
research.
27Our results also strengthen the idea that credit could matter, above and beyond its role as propagator
of shocks hitting the economy. The credit system may not be merely an ampliﬁer of economic shocks as
in the ﬁnancial accelerator model. At the very least, the importance of past credit growth as a predictor
for ﬁnancial crises and the robustness of the results to the inclusion of other key macro variables, raises
the possibility that the ﬁnancial sector is quite capable of creating its very own shocks. While different
identiﬁcation strategies are clearly needed, our historical data lend some support the ideas of scholars
such as Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978) who have argued that the ﬁnancial system itself is prone




innovation and regulatory ease broke that link, setting in train an unprecedented expansion in the role of
credit in the macroeconomy. Without an historical perspective, these profound changes are difﬁcult to
appreciate, and one task of this paper has been to document this evolution and its ramiﬁcations.
We saw how the stable relationship between money and credit broke down after the Great Depres-
sion and WW2, as a new secular trend took hold that carried on until today’s crisis. We conjecture that
these changes conditioned, and were conditioned by, the broader environment of macroeconomic and
ﬁnancial policies: after the 1930s the ascent of ﬁat money plus Lenders of Last Resort—and a slow shift
back toward ﬁnancial laissez faire—encouraged the expansion of credit to occur. The policy backstop
also, to some degree, insulated the real economy from a scaling up of the damaging effects that prior
crises had wrought in days when the ﬁnancial system played a less pivotal role. However, implicit gov-
ernment insurance and the prospect of rescue operations might also have contributed to the spectacular
growth of ﬁnance and leverage within the system, creating more of the very hazards they were intending
to solve. The important structural changes that have taken place in the ﬁnancial system over the past
decades have led to a greater role of credit in the macroeconomy. It is a mishap of history that just at the
time when credit mattered more than ever before, the reigning doctrine had sentenced it to playing no
constructive role in monetary policy.
In terms of lessons for policymakers and researchers, history demonstrates that they ignore credit at
their peril. Credit aggregates contain valuable information about the likelihood of future ﬁnancial crises.
It is not, of course, a perfect predictor, and there may be fundamental reasons why, in some periods, es-
pecially in eras of ﬁnancial development and innovation, credit expands to support real economic gains.
At the same time, the record shows that recurrent episodes of ﬁnancial instability have more often than
not been the result of credit booms gone wrong, most likely due to failures in the operation and/or reg-
ulation of the ﬁnancial system. For economists, adherence to the money view, not to mention the irrele-
vance view, has been called into question by the crisis. For policymakers, a complacent attitude towards
the growth in the scale and riskiness of the credit system now looks like a misguided choice that ignored
history.19 Financialhistorianshavelongwarnedthatmoreattentionshouldbepaidtorecurrentepisodes
of ﬁnancial sector instability in modern economies. We are hopeful that some of the ﬁrmer evidence we
have assembled here will inform new avenues of research into the role of credit in the macroeconomy.
19Notable examples being the critical reaction and laissez faire response to precrisis warnings sounded at the Jackson Hole
conferencesbyBorioandWhite(2003)andRajan(2005). However, policymakersarenowtakingaharderlookathowtoregulate
credit and the procylicality of the ﬁnancial system (e.g., Adair Turner 2009).
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31APPENDIX
Appendix Table A1 gives our list of ﬁnancial crisis dates. The sources for our other data were as follows. The raw
data are shown in Appendix Figure A1.
RGDP: Real GDP per capita from Angus Maddison, Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP ,
1–2006 AD. http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. CPI: unless stated otherwise all data from Taylor, Alan M. (2002),
A Century of Purchasing-Power Parity, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 84(1): 139–150; data for 2000–
2008 from International Financial Statistics (IFS); GDP and I/Y: unless stated otherwise below pre-1945 data come
from Brian R. Mitchell, 1993, International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750–1988, Second Edition, New
York, Macmillan; Brian R. Mitchell, 1992, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750–1988. London, Macmil-
lan; complemented by investment data from Jones, Matthew T., and Maurice Obstfeld, 1997, “Saving, Invest-
ment, and Gold: A Reassessment of Historical Current Account Data,” NBER Working Paper no. 6103. Dataset:
http://www.nber.org/databases/jones-obstfeld/; post-1945 data from IFS. STIR: short-term interest rate — unless
otherwise stated the pre-WW2 data come from the dataset of Obstfeld, M., J. C.Shambaugh, and A. M. Taylor, 2005,
“The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility,” Review of
Economics and Statistics 87:423–38, and from the League of Nations Statistical Yearbook, various issues; data for
the postwar period are taken from IFS. L: total domestic currency loans of banks and banking institutions to resi-
dentcompaniesandhouseholds(excludingotherﬁnancialinstitutions). C:totaldomesticcurrencyassetsofbanks
andbankinginstitutions; ofwhich: claimsongovernmentandthepublicsectorfor1950–2008weretakenfromIFS.
NM: narrow money (M1); M: broad money (M2 or M3); E: equity market index; from the Global Financial Database
unless noted otherwise.
Australia
L/C: 1870–1945 - table 1, total assets within Australia and total advances in Australia. S.J. Butlin, A.R. Hall, R.C.
White, Australian Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1817–1945, Sydney 1971; 1953–2008— total loans and bank as-
sets from Reserve Bank of Australia, Australian Economic Statistics 1949–50 to 1996–97, http://www.rba.gov.au/
statistics/op8_index.html; 1997–2008 - Reserve Bank of Australia, Assets of Financial Institutions, table D02 and
B01. NM/M: 1870–1983 — PF 57–71 from David Pope, Australian Money and Banking Statistics, Canberra, Aus-
tralian National University, 1986; 1984–2008 — IFS.
Canada
L/C: 1870–1953 - M.C. Urquhart, Historical Statistics of Canada, Toronto 1965, Cambridge UP . Total loans and total
assets of banks: series H55-H160. 1953–2008 StatCan, Table 176-0015: Chartered banks, assets and liabilities. NM:
1870–1929 — Rousseau and Wachtel; 1930–1940— League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook; 1953–2008— IFS. M:
1870–1938 — Based on unpublished datasets from Michael Bordo (henceforth Bordo); 1948–2008 — IFS.
Denmark
L: 1885–1938 — table 6.6, loans of commercial banks 1885–1938, Hans Chr. Johansen, Dansk Historisk Statistik
1814–1980;1951–2008: totallending(excl. MFI’s)ofcommercialbanksandsavingsbanks: KimAbildgren,Financial
LiberalizationandCreditDynamicsinDenmarkinthePost-WorldWarIIPeriod,DanmarksNationalbank,Working
Papers47/2007. C:table6.6-assetsofcommercialbanks,HansChr. Johansen,DanskHistoriskStatistik; 1981–2008
— series L plus holdings of securities and other assets from OECD (2009). NM/M: 1870–1940 — table 6.2, 6.6, 6.8 in
Hans Chr. Johansen, Dansk Historisk Statistik; 1950–2008 — IFS.
32TABLE A1: CRISIS DATES BY COUNTRY, 1870–2008
Australia 1893 1989
Canada 1873 1907 1923
Switzerland 1870 1910 1931 2008
Germany 1873 1891 1901 1907 1931 2008
Denmark 1877 1885 1902 1907 1921 1931 1987
Spain 1883 1890 1913 1920 1924 1931 1978 2008
France 1882 1889 1907 1930 2008
U.K. 1873 1890 1974 1984 1991 2007
Italy 1873 1887 1891 1907 1921 1930 1935 1990 2008
Japan 1882 1900 1904 1907 1913 1927 1992
Netherlands 1893 1907 1921 1939 2008
Norway 1899 1922 1931 1988
Sweden 1878 1907 1922 1931 1991 2008
USA 1873 1884 1893 1907 1929 1984 2007






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE A1: RAW DATA
33France
L: 1870–1940 from Saint Marc, Michelle, Histoire monétaire de la France, 1800–1980, Paris, 1983, who used credit
data for Crédit Lyonnais, Société général, Comptoir national d’escompte and Crédit industriel et commercial. She
assumed that total loans in the French economy averaged about twice that amount before 1940; 1945–2008: data
for 1945–1969 from Conseil National du Credit (data kindly shared by Eric Monnet, Paris); 1970–1984 from INSEE
(“Crédit à l’économie de caractère bancaire”); 1985–2008 from Banque de France (MFI loans to private sector res-
idents, A20.A.1.U6.2200.Z01). The pre-1895 loan data are subject to very crude rounding errors and are not used.
NM:1870–1940fromSaintMarc(1983); 1949–2008fromIFS(M1). M:1920–1940fromPatat, Jean-PierreandMichel
Lutfalla, Histoire monétaire de la France au XXe siècle, Paris 1986; 1949–2008 from INSEE and Banque de France
(M2). E: Hautcoeur, Pierre-Cyrille and D. Le Bris, “A Challenge to Triumphant Optimists? A New Blue Chips Index
for the Paris Stock-Exchange (1854–2007),” Financial History Review, 17 (2), 2010, pp. 141–83.
Germany
L: 1880–1940 - table B1 1.05, total loans of Aktienbanken, Sparkassen, Hypothekenbanken and Genossenschafts-
banken; Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen, 1876–1975, Fritz Knapp: Frankfurt
am Main, 1976. 1948–2008 - Bundesbank, Lending to domestic non-banks (All categories of banks, OU01115).
C: 1880–1940 - table A 1.01, total assets of Aktienbanken, Sparkassen, Hypothekenbanken and Genossenschafts-
banken; Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen, 1876–1975, Fritz Knapp: Frankfurt
am Main, 1976. 1950–2008 — Bundesbank: Balance sheet total (All categories of banks, OU0308). NM: 1876–1940
—Bundesbank (1976); 1950–2008 from IFS (M1). M: 1880–1940 from Bordo; 1950–2008 from IFS (M2).
Italy
L/C: 1870–1940 — unpublished workﬁle: Alfredo Gigliobianco, Claire Giordano and Gianni Toniolo, “Regulators
and Innovators Play Tag: The Italian Historical Experience”, forthcoming. The datasources are De Mattia, R. (1967),
I bilanci degli istituti di emissione italiani 1845–1936, Vol. 1, Banca d’Italia: Rome, for the period 1870–1889; Cotula
F. et al (1996), I bilanci delle aziende di credito 1890–1936, Editori Laterza: Rome-Bari, for the period 1890–1935;
Unpublished data, Bank of Italy, for the period 1936–1973. 1950–1994— Bank of Italy, total bank loans (S858159),
extended 1995–2008 using growth rates from IFS and Bank of Italy (S515363M andS640592M, “lending to domestic
non-ﬁnancial enterprise and households”); assets 1950–2008 - Bank of Italy, series S049387, extended 1997–2008
using growth rates of banking sector assets from Bank of Italy (S463168M). NM/M: 1870–1939 M0 — Fratianni, M.
and F. Spinelli, A Monetary History of Italy, Cambridge 1997; 1880–1945 M3 from Bordo; 1948–2008 - Bank of Italy,
M1 and M2 Plus; after 1998 Italian contribution to Eurozone M1 and M3 from the Bank of Italy. E: Da Pozzo M. and
Felloni G., La Borsa Valori di Genova nel secolo XIX, Torino, ILTE, 1963, Tab. LXVII, p. 499; and Parodi S., Il mercato
ﬁnanziario genovese dal 1895 al 1914, unpublished thesis (tesi di laurea), University of Genoa, 1966, Tab XLV, p.
238. Data made available by Angelo Riva (Paris).
Japan
L/C: 1870–1940 — Bank of Japan, Hundred-year Statistics of the Japanese Economy, Tokyo 1966 (Meiji-Iko Hompo
Shuyo Keizaitokei); 1953–1982 — Tamaki, Norio, Japanese banking: a history, 1859–1959, Cambridge 1995, and
IFS, 1983–2008— Bank of Japan (series FA’FAABK-FAAB2DBEA40, Loans of domestically licensed banks less loans
to other ﬁnancial institutions); total domestic credit 1953–2008 from IFS. CPI: 1885–1940 — Obstfeld and Tay-
lor (2003); 1950–2008— IFS. NM: 1880–1940 — Bordo and Eichengreen (2001); 1955–2008— IFS (M1). M: 1901–
1918 — Bordo; 1919–1940 — Mitchell; 1955–2008 — IFS (M2). STIR: 1870–1940 from Bank of Japan, Nihon Ginko
Hyakunen-shi Shiryo-hen (Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years-Materials), Tokyo 1986 - http://www.boj.or.jp/
type/pub/hyakunen/ hyakus.htm; 1950–2008 from IFS.
34Netherlands
L: 1900–1982 sum of “Korte vorderingen op privatesector”, “Onderhandseleningen”, “Hypothecaireleningen”, “Di-
verse binnenlandactive,” table 3.1 - De Nederlandsche Bank,Nederlandse ﬁnancile instellingen in de twintigste
eeuw: balansreeksenen naamlijst van handelsbanken, DNB Statistische Cahiers Nr. 3, 2000;1982–2008 DNB, Bank-
ing statistics, table 5.6ek. C: 1900–1945 Bilans total (excl. foreign assets) of commercial banks, table 3.1 - De
Nederlandsche Bank, Nederlandse ﬁnancile instellingen in de twintigste eeuw: balansreeksen en naamlijst van
handelsbanken,D NB Statistische Cahiers Nr. 3, 2000; 1948–2008 IFS. NM: 1900–1992 — Bordo and League of Na-
tions; 1993–2008— DNB, Table 5.4, Contribution of the Netherlands to euro area monetary aggregates, Guilder
M1; 1945–1998 — IFS; 1999–2008 — DNB, Table 5.4, Contribution of the Netherlands to euro area monetary ag-
gregates, Guilder M3. GDP and I/Y: 1880–1913 — van Zanden et al., National Accounts of the Netherlands, 1880–
1913; http://national accounts.niwi.knaw.nl/start.htm; 1918–1940 —Mitchell; 1948–2008 — IFS. E: Tweehonderd
jaar statistiek in tijdreeksen, 1800–1999, University of Groningen and Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Voor-
burg/Heerlrn 2001, Table 10. Data made available by Peter Koujdis (Barcelona).
Norway
L/C: table A2 and A4, Eitrheim, Klovland, and Qvigstad (eds.), Historical Monetary Statistics for Norway, chapter
10: Credit, banking and monetary developments in Norway, Norges Banks Occasional Papers nr. 35, Oslo 2004,
http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____42927.aspxNM/M: table 2a, Jan T. Klovland, Monetary Aggre-
gatesinNorway,1819–2003,chapter5,in: Eitrheimetal. (eds.),http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____
42935.aspx; GDP , I/Y: Ola H. Grytten, The gross domestic product for Norway, 1830–2003, chapter 6, in: Eitrheim et
al. (eds.), http://www. norges-bank.no/templates/ article____42937.aspx.
Spain
L/C: 1900–2000 — Entitades de credito, table 9.12 from A. Carreras and X. Tafunell (eds.), Estadísticas Históricas de
España, Madrid 2005. 2000–2008 — growth rates of loans and assets for MFI’s from Bank of Spain - Residentes en
España, total prestamos (BE060106) and total activos (BE060102). NM/M: 1870–1998: A. Carreras and X. Tafunell
(eds.), Estadísticas Históricas de España, Madrid 2005, table 9.16; 1998–2008 IFS. GDP/IY: 1870–2000 Prados de la
Escosura, Leandro, El progreso economico de Espana, 1850–2000, Madrid 2003, Appendix M.
Sweden
L: Table 2, Bank lending, monthly ﬁgures 1871–1938, Riksbank, Historical monetary statistics for Sweden, 1668–
2008, Swedish Monetary History Project. C: table 8 — Income Statement items of the Swedish commercial banks
1870–2005, total assets of commercial banks (minus foreign assets), Riksbank, Historical monetary statistics for
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